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In the battle for survival of the reasonable society the television camera is the supertank-the Queen of the Battlefield. Ordinary mortals
are wise to learn her ways and treat her with respect, but those who
serve in her entourage have an awful responsibility.
R. Clutterbuck, The Media and
Political Violence, 1981

Government leaders throughout the world are currently addressing
the growing threat of terrorist activity. The leaders recognize the media's role as a conduit for terrorist demands' and are taking action. All
agree that "media terrorism ' 2 is an evil that should be eradicated, yet,
while there has been much serious research on the problem of the media's role in domestic violence,3 the problem of how the media should
function in a terrorist-crisis situation has not been systematically studied. 4 Some observers accuse the news media of inspiring terrorist acts
or serving as willing accomplices of the terrorists. 5 Others allege that
the media is responsible for terrorism only to the same degree that civil
aviation is responsible for hijackings: "One can stop hijacking by
grounding all civil aircraft; perhaps terrorism could be reduced by com'6
plete media blackouts."
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has taken a less hostile
view. Thatcher has proposed "journalistic self-discipline" to starve fu'7
ture terrorists of "the oxygen of publicity on which they depend."
United States Attorney General Edwin Meese III endorsed the Prime
Minister's proposal and took it a step further. Meese proposed that the
1. See Jenkins, Area of Consensus, Areas of Ignorance, in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 171 (B. Eichelman, D. Soskis, & W. Reid ed. 1983).
2. Charles Krauthammer, senior editor of the New Republic and a contributing essayist at Time, labels this form of terrorism, created after 1968 by the Palestine Liberation
Organization [hereinafter cited as "PLO"], with its random attacks on anyone, as " 'media
terrorism,' because it can exist only if there is an interpreter to give it meaning." Terrorism and the Media: A Discussion,Harper's Forum, October 1985, 47, 50 [hereinafter cited
as Harper's].
3. See e.g., Baron & Reiss, Same Time, Next Year: Aggregate Analyses of the Mass
Media and Violent Behavior, 50 Am. Soc. Rev. 347 (1985); Freedman, Effect of Television
Violence on Aggressiveness, 96 Psychological Bull. 227 (1984); Kessler & Stipp, The Impact
of Fictional Television Suicide Stories on U.S. Fatalities: A Replication, 90 Am. J. Soc.
151 (1984); Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: FirstAmendment Principlesand
Social Science Theory, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1123 (1978); Phillips & Hensley, When Violence Is
Rewarded or Punishe& The Impact of Mass Media Stories on Homicide, 34 J. Comm. 101
(1984).
4. See Alexander, Terrorism, the Media, and the Police, in Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response 331, 343-345 (R. Kupperman & D. Trent ed. 1979) for a summary of research
activities that have dealt with some aspects of the terrorist problem.
5. See Jenkins, supra note 1, at 17.
6. See Jenkins. supra note 1, at 17.
7. Apple, Meese Asserts US. Favors Press Code, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1985, 1, at 7,
col. 1.
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United States Government "ask news organizations to adopt a voluntary
code of restraint in reporting terrorist incidents." Speaking before the
American Bar Association, Meese stated that he would oppose legislation restricting news practices. He suggested, however, that newspapers, magazines and broadcasters should agree to "some principles
reduced to writing."9
This Note attempts to clarify the relationship between terrorism
and the media. It evaluates the policy considerations' regarding the
propriety of media coverage or non-coverage of terrorist activities. The
current forms of media regulation, and their applicability to the terrorist problem, are considered. This Note concludes that internal industry
standards, if sufficiently effective, would be the most favorable method
of regulation in this instance, and suggests industry guidelines to articulate the media's role in combatting terrorism.
I.

POLICIES AFFECTED BY MEDIA COVERAGE
OF TERRORISM

The policies that might be served by regulating the media's coverage of terrorism, in descending order of the need to regulate, include
the following: (1) protecting victims' privacy; (2) preserving domestic
order; (3) prolonging the crisis; (4) encouraging future acts of terrorism;
(5) sensationalising; (6) ensuring the safety and well-being of target victims; (7) providing a forum of communication; and (8) satisfying the
public's need to know.
A.

PROTECTION OF PRIVACY

The invasion of a terrorist victim's privacy is the most direct and
visible harm from media coverage of terrorism. The invasion of privacy
by the media both during and following a terrorist event such as kidnapping, for instance, can be as traumatic to victims and their families
as the actual kidnapping itself. If business executives dicker about ransom, for instance, company management will be perceived as insensitive
or materialistic in its concern. Thus, publicized ransom decisions can
adversely effect executive morale and increase exposure to future terrorist attacks.
In one incident, after hostages were freed, the police warned them
not to give interviews to avoid increasing the complexity and difficulty
of the prosecutor's task. Hostages complained that some journalists insisted on getting interviews. One network representative asserted that
8. Id
9. Id.
10. I will periodically refer to harms from the coverage of terrorism as "anti-speech
interests."
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the public has the "right to know."'" In declining to grant the interview, one harassed hostage replied, "Is it in the Constitution that the
public has the right to invade my privacy, to insist on exposing people
2
already humiliated, to wallow in their pain and misery?'
B.

LAw ENFORCEMENT

The public has a valid interest in preserving domestic order.' 3 The
media, especially the broadcaster, can often frustrate police management by interfering with on-going operations, compounding the pressure on authorities, and impairing their ability to make decisions.
Full media disclosure of law enforcement activities could hinder
the preservation of domestic order and impede counterterrorist efforts. 1 4 Media coverage of such activities could lead to interference with
law enforcement efforts in siege management crises. Or such disclosure
could reveal particular law enforcement techniques and strategies of
surveillance, investigation, or pursuit, and thus impede counterterrorist
5
efforts in the future.'
The takeover of three buildings in Washington, D.C., in March
1977, for instance, became a major media event in which the media unknowingly worked at cross purposes with the responsible law enforcement officials. 16 The media gave the Hanifi Muslim terrorists direct
intelligence information (adding to the terrorists power) through on-site
television coverage. Journalists directly telephoned the terrorists for
interviews, thus hindering communication between the terrorists and
police negotiators.17 During this incident, a television journalist publicly announced the lifting of a basket by rope to an upper floor, where
some people, unknown to the gunmen, had barricaded themselves in a
room. Hence, the gunmen were probably informed of the television reporter's observations by fellow terrorists who were monitoring the news
media.'

8

During the same incident, a prominent Washington newscaster mistakenly labeled a gunman as a Black Muslim. Because the gunman's
family had been murdered by Black Muslims, he flew into a rage,
stormed into the hostages' room, and declared that he would kill one of
11. Alexander, supra note 4, at 338-39.
12. Alexander, supra note 4 at 339.
13. See Mann, Personnel and Property of TransnationalBusiness Operations, in
Legal Aspects of International Terrorism 399, 439 (A. Evans & J. Murphy ed. 1978).
14. Id
15. Id16. Alexander, supra note 4, at 337.
17. Alexander, supra note 4, at 337.
18. Alexander, supra note 4 at 337-38.
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them "in retaliation for the newsman's words."'19

In another incident of media irresponsibility during the siege, a local journalist, reporting live, over both the radio and television, described what he thought were boxes of ammunition being taken into
the building in preparation for what he termed an "all-out police assault." 20 The boxes, in fact, contained food for the hostages.2 ' The
repercussions of such journalistic irresponsibilities could have been
devastating.
In some incidents, the media's irresponsibility has resulted in fatal
repercussions. For example, journalists directly contributed to the
death of a hostage in a hijacking incident. While terrorists on board the
hijacked jet were listening to the public radio broadcast, the journalist
reported that the jet's "captain was passing valuable intelligence information to the authorities on the ground through his normal radio trans23
missions." 22 The terrorists subsequently executed the captain.
When a terrorist incident is covered by the media, an inevitable
critical relationship develops between the media responsible for reporting the episode, and the law enforcement personnel handling the incident. A terrorist event can seldom be kept secret. Especially in a siege
situation, blocked streets or a surrounded house quickly becomes a
honey pot for journalists. Law enforcement officials must realize that
some journalists will go to any extreme to get news. The police must
therefore decide, case by case, between setting up a complete barricade
or being so casual that the media may thwart the chances of a success24
ful rescue.
C.

PROLONG THE CRISIS

Media attention may do more than interfere with law enforcement
management during a terrorist crisis. It may actually prolong the crisis
by introducing more variables into the equation. During the 1985 TWA
hijacking, for instance, the White House considered asking the networks to limit their coverage on the grounds that "emotional pleas
'25
[were] making it more difficult to manage the crisis."
Once begun, media coverage gives the terrorist an incentive to prolong the crisis. For example, the American hostages kidnapped in Iran
might not have been held as long as they were had the Iranians not re19. Fortunately, the threat was not carried out. Alexander, supra note 4, at 338.
20. Alexander, supra note 4, at 338.

21. Alexander, supra note 4, at 338.
22. Alexander, supra note 4, at 339.
23. Alexander, supra note 4, at 339.

24. See R. Clutterbuck, The Media and Political Violence 133 (1982).
25. Corry, Must TVBeAt The Mercy of Terrorists?, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985, 11, at 1,
col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Corry].
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alized that they had created an effective television stage which gave
them immediate access to millions of people. The Iranians exploited
the hostage crisis in a manner that would not have been possible without television cameras. 26 Speculating about why the Amal seemed reluctant to give up the hostages on the final weekend of the TWA
hijacking, Peter Jennings remarked: "They were at the center of the
'27
universe-these hostage holders-why should they give them up?
D.

FuTuRE AcTs OF TERRORISM

Media coverage of terrorism may further harm society by encouraging future acts of terrorism. The broadcasting of terrorist acts can lead
to future acts because such coverage can (1) give terrorists advantages
by providing worldwide publicity for their ideologies and organizational
advantages, (2) result in imitated acts, and (3) make victims more vulnerable to repeated attacks.
1. Advantages to Terrorists
a. Publicity Advantage: By its very nature, terrorism is meant to
capture the attention of the public. It is directed at changing the way
society thinks. Modern technology, through television and the capabilities of global satellite communications systems, has provided terror
groups with a critical communications instrument through which the

28
terrorist receives instantaneous worldwide publicity.

Terrorists use the media as a form of political advertising. 29 Since
they cannot buy television time, they gain coverage through commission
of terrorist acts. Just as early television sponsors produced shows as vehicles for their commercials,30 media terrorists now provide live
31
drama-murder and kidnapping-in return for "advertising time".
26. Harper's, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Charles Krauthammer).
27. Corry, supra note 25.
28. This Note primarily concerns the broadcast media, hereinafter referred to as
"media."

29. The media has been labeled as terrorism's "greatest asset" and the terrorist's
"best friend". Mann, supra note 13, at 437. Televisions have been said to comprise the
"universal hearth" over which terrorists can spread their message by capturing the television cameras first. Corry, supra note 25.
30. See Harper's, supra note 2, at 50.
31. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 332. Charles Krauthammer gave an example of
how reporters can serve terrorists' propaganda and welfare needs as follows:
In 1979, for example, terrorists attacked the American Embassy in Beirut with
grenades. One network correspondent explained that this action was 'perhaps an
expression of resentment and frustration' on the part of Palestinians over the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Here we reach a level where an attack on innocents
is rationalized as a psychological necessity. Or consider the attack on a bus near
Tel Aviv [in April]: it was generally explained as the PLO's assertion that it still
existed after its expulsion from Lebanon, a kind of 'I kill, therefore I am.' With-
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In 1968, for example, the Palestine Liberation Organization's3 2 terrorist acts were intended not to demoralize the Israelis, but to publicize
political grievances.33 The intended audience was not the immediate
victims, the airline passengers, or even the Israelis, but the entire
world. 34 Thus, restrictions on media publicity might have prevented
these terrorists actions.
The Irish Republican Army- was also well aware of terrorists' ability to extort publicity. One of the few university graduates who joined
the Provisional IRA (though she soon left it) articulated the importance
that the group attached to propaganda:
Bombs were frequently timed to coincide with the evening rush hour
when they would cause maximum impact. This had the added advantage that they would get a mention in the six o'clock TV news. The
same applied to shooting incidents in which the aim was to involve the
army; these would be timed so that the IRA's pre-drafted story,
amended as necessary, could be issued to the press in time for news
bulletin or newspaper deadlines-but carefully calculated to ensure
that police or army accounts would be too late .... 36
In July of 1974, an analysis of sixty bomb explosions showed that over
eighty percent were timed to obtain maximum coverage on television
37
news.
It is also a concern that the media loses interest in covering nowmundane hijackings and kidnappings, terrorists will then employ more
spectacular methods of attracting publicity. The "fanatical" attack on
the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, is one such
38
example.
b. OrganizationalAdvantage: Media coverage not only serves terrorists' ideological purposes by publicizing their campaign; it also gives
them an organizational advantage by allowing a specific group to exhibit
out the press to carry this message, the act would have been meaningless; in fact,
since it had no military or political purpose, it probably would not have been
committed in the first place.
Harper's, supra note 2, at 58. He further stated that "when the point of a terrorist attack
is to force the media to function as interpreters, the media have a heavy responsibility not
to do the interpreting." Id.
32. Hereinafter cited as "PLO."
33. Harper's, supra note 2, at 50.
34. Harper's, supra note 2, at 50.
35. Hereinafter cited as "IRA."
36. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 91-92 (stating that "most news reporters confirm
this") (citing Maria McGuire, To Take Arms (1973)).

37. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 91-92 (citing I.D. Evans, Public Relations Practice within the Army (unpublished paper, National Defense College, Latimer, 1976)).

38. Wilber, The Role of the Media During a TerroristIncident, FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin 20, 20 (1985).
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its strength and audaciousness in comparison with its rivals.3 9 Any organized "group" must periodically consider its organizational allegiance,
effectiveness, and survival. 4° Terrorist groups willing to sacrifice lives
for their cause often engage in acts of terror to insure loyalty to that
cause. 4 1 Terror is also used by such groups to maintain internal discipline and to punish members for disobedience and defection. 42 Their
methods of internal discipline can be as brutal as the lynchings of the
43
Japanese Red Army, or the kneecapping of the IRA.
Acts of terror can also be used as a tool to prevent the formulation
of splinter groups and an instrument of intergroup rivalry." An example of this "intergroup dynamic" is evident in the words of the Palestine
Black September Organization. Responding to the western world's outrage at the Arab group's attack on the Israeli Olympic team, 45 he stated:
Call us what you may but it's good for our morale, and it may help the
moderate elements in the movement to take a more militant position.
After all our defeats, this comes as an uplift. We feel we have to do
something. What does the world
expect of young Arabs these days?
46
We have seen too many defeats.
2. Imitated Acts
Worldwide terrorist publicity may also lead to an imitation effect,
which, in turn, can become a direct cause of subsequent acts of terrorism. When terrorist techniques are disseminated and stories of daring
and success against authorities are created, the success can encourage
angry and frustrated groups, even in other countries, to imitate the
acts. 47 An example of such imitation occurred when Argentina's
Montoneros stole the body of ex-President Pedro Aramburu to insure
that Eva Peron's body would be returned from Spain.48 Shortly afterwards, Burmese terrorists stole the body of U Thant to use in negotiat49
ing with the Burmese government.
The recurrence of similar kinds of terrorist incidents following
(and seemingly related to) particularly graphic reporting of a terrorist
event has led some observers to conclude that there is a correlation be39. See Mann, supra note 13, at 409-10, 438.
40. See Mann, supra note 13, at 409.

41.
42.
(1975);
43.

See Mann, supra note 13, at 409.
See Mann, supra note 13, at 409; see also, J.B. Bell, Transnational Terror 10-19
B. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict 5-6 (1975).
See Mann, supra note 11, at 62.

44. Mann, supra note 13, at 409.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Mann, supra note 13, at 409.
Mann, supra note 13, at 409-10 (citing N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1972, at 12, col. 6).
Alexander, supra note 4, at 337.
Alexander, supra note 4, at 337.
Alexander, supra note 4, at 337.
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tween the reporting of an event and subsequent similar events. 50 For
instance, some studies assert that people who watch and listen to the
exportation of violent techniques on the news media get ideas about doing the same things themselves. 5 ' The more publicity that the media
gives to bomb scares, for instance, the more bomb scares there are
likely to be. And reports about plane hijacking appear to have lead to
additional plane hijackings.52 Even if such a relationship exists, however, it would not prove that publicity of terrorist acts caused or encouraged later terrorist acts.
3.

Vulnerable Victims

The media's coverage of terrorism events can also lead to future
terrorist attacks by increasing particular victims' vulnerability to terrorist demands. Coverage can increase terrorism victims' vulnerability by
(1) initially putting victims in a position where they cannot protect their
own interests, and (2) publicizing the concessions that such victims
make to terrorists and hence increasing their susceptibility to future
attacks.
E.

SENSATIONALISM

Media coverage of terrorism is often attacked for "sensationalism." 53 While it is unclear exactly what is meant by media sensationalism, 4 there are probably two primary objections. First, media coverage

can justify terrorism by leading its audience to view terrorism in a
favorable light. Second, it can offend its audience, or make people uncomfortable by espousing actions and doctrines which to many people
are abhorrent.
When the media sensationalises a terrorist event, it seems to superimpose a "different reality" on terrorism. Terrorism has been defined
as "an act of theater designed to have a strong psychological impact
upon a vast audience. The image becomes as important as the reality,
50. Jenkins, supra note 1, at 163. Many studies have examined the relationship between mass communication and terrorism. Various aspects of the interaction have been
examined, including even a search for a direct relationship between the number of incidents and the number of newspaper column inches or network minutes devoted to terrorist activity. See Jenkins, supra note 1, at 16. But see Jenkins, supra note 1, at 16 (stating
that "[t]here has yet to be an adequate explanation of society's appetite for vicarious violence and of the relationship between the audience, the victim, and the events").
51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
52. Alexander, supra note 4, at 336; cf. Phillips, Airplane Accident FatalitiesIncrease
Just After Stories About Murderand Suicide, 201 Science 748 (1978).
53. Corry, supra note 25.
54. It is also unclear how to purely avoid sensationalising news stories. For example,
it is probably not possible to report a mass murder in a nonsensationalised manner.
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for the terrorist victim is rarely the ultimate target." 55 For example, a
viewer may intellectually know that the hijacking of a jet is a terrorist
act, but television obscures the perception. On television, the 1985 hijacking of the TWA jet, along with the murder of one passenger and the
incarceration of others, came across the screen not as a story about terrorism; it was a story about negotiations and how to set the hostages
free.
One journalist observed that the media's sensationalising of the
story changed its audience's reactions. 56 The journalist observed that
the media's analyses and constant repetition of the hijackers' demands
shifted the responsibility for the hostages away from the hijackers and
the Amal militia to Israel.5 7 While no psychological studies have attempted to document the effects of this kind of reporting, it could lead
viewers to view the terrorist act more favorably than they ought to. An
ABC poll taken during the TWA crisis, for example, found that an increased number of Americans than ever before then wanted the United
5
States to distance its foreign policy from Israel. s
Similarly, Alan Chalfont, a former minister in the British Foreign
Office who writes widely on international affairs, suggests that the media's problem is its tendency to adopt a position of what he terms "mag59
isterial objectivity" between our society and those attacking it.
Chalfont states that "the media subtly excuse certain terrorist acts by
implying that they arise out of intolerable social conditions or intolerable oppression." 60 Sensationalism, under this theory, is undesirable because it does not tailor its coverage to present only the "correct"
viewpoint. 61 The fallacy with this theory is that it assumes a purely
"right" and "wrong" world.6 2 There are virtually no issues, especially
political, that have easily discernible rights and wrongs to justify such
paternalism in media coverage.
55. Wilber, supra note 38, at 20 (citing A. Miller, Terrorism, The Media And The Law
58 (1982)).
56. Corry, supra note 25.
57. Corry, supra note 25.
58. Corry, supra note 25. The fact that media coverage can change Americans' views
on foreign policy is not necessarily "bad." The primary argument here is against reporting which presents to the public only biased coverage.
59. Harper's, supra note 2, at 56.
60. Harper's supra note 2, at 56. Chalfont sees these justifications "in the media's
tendency to equate the actions of legitimate governments, such as that in El Salvador, in
fighting terrorists and revolutionaries with the activities of the terrorists themselves."
61. See Harper's supra note 2, at 56 (asking whether we can "simply accept the fact
that we are at war with international terrorism, that there are two sides, ours and
theirs?").
62. The media presents distorted pictures of poverty, depressions, farm bankruptcies,
trade deficits, and any number of complex phenomena.
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I believe that the problem with such sensationalised reporting is
that the media is failing to fulfill its role of objective reporting.
Although the media is usually considered uninvolved and proper in reporting criminal activity, when terrorists use the media to obtain their
own objectives, journalists make, rather than report, the news. Subsequently, the public is unable to form its own opinions based on unbiased
reporting.
F. FORUM OF COMMUNICATION
Media coverage can discourage future terrorist acts by providing a
forum in which terrorists can ventilate their anger and frustration.63 In
some situations, media publicity can calm terrorist outrage by giving
terrorists a voice. In one instance, hijackers demanded that a number
of newspapers publish propaganda tracts. The simple compliance of
several major newspapers to this request contributed to the incident's
is
resolution." The more media coverage given, the more the terrorist
'65
likely to see himself as part of, rather than outside, the "system.
G.

THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO KNOW

The principal drawback of any restriction on media coverage is that
it necessarily limits the public's access to information. 66 Because terrorist acts have a great impact on the public order, the public should be
advised of the issues involved, the response of law enforcement authorities, and the outcome of the case.6 7 In addition, the public is just plain
interested in terrorist activities-even if only because of the sensationalism aspect.
Some commentators do not give much weight to this right-to-know
argument. John O'Sullivan, 68 for instance, has stated that he would be
perfectly prepared to support a ban on interviews with terrorists in
Northern Ireland; the only justification advanced for such interviews-namely, that we need to know what the terrorists' viewpoints are-is
absurd. 69 He has concluded that because the public knows what the ter63. Alexander, supra note 4, at 339.
64. Alexander, supra note 4, at 339.
65. Alexander, supra note 4, at 339.
66. Journalists claim that because what is "newsworthy" is within the judgment of
editors and reporters, the exercise of this decision is a public matter. Alexander, supra

note 4, at 339 (citing to the Draft Card Burning Cases: United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968); and United States v. Kiger, 297 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal denied, 421
F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970)). See also Mann, supra note 13,
at 439.
67. Alexander, supra note 4, at 339.
68. John O'Sullivan is on the staff of the London Daily Telegraph and Policy Review.
69. Harper's, supra note 2, at 53.
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rorists views are before they ever appear on television, their interviews
need not be covered. 70 This is a very weak argument, however, for censoring interviews. Under this rationale, the government could ban interviews with all public figures on the grounds that the public already
knows their views. Such a basis for regulation is clearly
impermissible. 71
A further extension to the right-to-know argument is that full disclosure by the media may actually be the best approach to solving the
terrorist problem. Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote: "Publicity and openness, honest and complete, that is the prime condition for the health of
any society. '72 Only with full and balanced coverage can the public ac73
tually see terrorist acts for what they really are.
The United Kingdom's sub judice doctrine provides for the virtual
' '74
blackout of further comment on a case when it becomes "subjudice.
This form of censorship has greatly assisted terrorists in the United
Kingdom. 75 For example, in the aftermath of "Blood Sunday" in 1972,
the IRA and their sympathizers were able to publicize a totally false
story of British army parachutists firing upon peaceful marchers because the government and security forces had been barred from refut76
ing the story due to a decision to hold a judicial inquiry.
The events began with a Catholic Civil Rights march.7 7 A group of
about 150 boys broke away and attacked one of a series of army roadblocks diverting the entryway into the Protestant area of Londonberry.
Meanwhile, the marchers gathered for a meeting about 500 yards away
behind high blocks of flats.
When an observer reported that the remainder of the march was
safely beyond the buildings, the army reserve (the 1st Battalion of the
Parachute Regiment) was ordered to arrest the boys attacking the army
road block. The Battalion soldiers chased the boys into an area of open
ground and arrested about 70 of the 150. While the Battalion soldiers
were catching the boys, the Battalion was fired upon both from the flats
70. Mann, supra note 13, at 440.
71. There is further argument for media coverage on the basis that if the government

were to destroy, or even abridge, the freedom of speech, such censorship could threaten
this nation's democratic system. And since it is a goal of terrorism to undermine authority and cause anarchy, a destruction of this country's democracy would ultimately result
in the terrorists' victory. A nation plagued with fear and subject to the harms that occur
through the media's coverage of terrorism, however, is probably not in a much healthier

state of
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

democratic fitness. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 170.
Livingstone, War vs. Terrorism, 1982 Inst. for Subnatl. Conflicts 76 (1982).
Livingstone, supra note 72.
R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 93.
R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 93.
R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 93.
R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 93.-94.
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and from another IRA barricade. The soldiers returned the fire. During the battle, an eyewitness behind the flats reported the arrival of
about 50 more armed IRA reinforcements. Thirteen young men were
killed.
As was the practice whenever security forces shot a Catholic insurgent, 78 the victim's weapons were removed by his comrades as they
withdrew. Since the IRA had failed to hit anyone with any of their
shots, they instantaneously put out the story that the soldiers had fired
upon a crowd of unarmed marchers. 79 The army immediately denied
this. And the evidence later proved it to be a total fabrication.8 0 But
the government's decision, the day after the event, to order a judicial
inquiry made the case sub judice, and thereby banned the publication of
their evidence until many weeks later. But the damage was done:
The highly emotive accounts of soldiers firing on the crowd went unanswered apart from the initial bare denials, and so were largely believed,
especially amongst the Irish community in the USA, to the enormous
benefit of the IRA funds.
This effect was increased by a number of British reporters who
had themselves heard only one side of the story. Some were avowedly
sympathetic to [the IRA's] cause (even though they avoided open support for the IRA) but others were honestly misled, and their reports,
repeated by American and Europeans newspapers, were valuable and
encouraging for the IRA. 8"

As a result, the continuing violence during the. 1972 year reached a peak
82
of nearly double that in any other year of the conflict.

Full disclosure can also serve the public by putting public pressure
on government officials to be accountable and act quickly. One aspect
of an informed public is that it is informed about the government's activity. And one benefit of an informed public is that it can make more
intelligent public decisions.
H.

BALANCING THE POLICY INTERESTS

In short, the primary problem with restricting terrorist news coverage is that it implies censorship and suppression. The National News
Council warned:
78. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 92.
79. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 92.
80. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 92. Forensic evidence later revealed that the
two sides fired a roughly equal number of rounds-a little over 100.
81. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 92.
82. R. Clutterbuck, supra note 24, at 94 (citing "Northern Ireland: Is There A Way?",
Washington Review, April 1978 (stating that deaths in 1972 were 467, compared with 175
the year before and 250 the year after-, the next highest figure was 296 in 1976)).
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[T]he dangers of suppression should be self-evident: doubts over what
the media have withheld and the motives for such a blackout; questions
about other types of news which might also have been withheld ostensibly in the public interest; and the greater possible risks involved in
wild and reckless rumors and exaggerated, provocative word-of-mouth
3
8

reports.

On the other hand, the media's right to report any and all news
cannot be asserted when there are equal, if not more compelling public
interests. Depending on the circumstances of each terrorist incident,
the safety of victims may be enhanced or endangered by the media's
publicity. Further, while responsible journalists would probably agree
that media coverage of terrorist incidents should not be sensationalised,
at the same time they would vigorously defend their journalistic right
to determine how any particular incident should be reported. The resulting tension between these opposing concerns and viewpoints raises
anew the continuing question of "responsible journalism."
II. EXISTING STANDARDS OF MEDIA REGULATION
s4
The news media have no set policy for reporting terrorist events.
Television journalists claim to use the same judgment and ethics as do
print journalists. News reporting is governed by the overall responsibility of the press: "to publish the news, and to use its resources to get the
whole truth. '8 5 Newspaper editors take responsibility for their coverage by going through an intensive editing process. Their equivalents in
television, however, tend to eliminate this decision-making process by
providing live coverage of terrorists, captives, or even mediators. Tele86
vision coverage thus becomes something that "just happens.
For example, in the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in Beirut, the
terrorists themselves edited the hostage interviews.8 7 The terrorists decided who would appear on the air and the networks then covered the
event live.88 The networks thus let the terrorists perform their editorial functions for them. In essence, the terrorist beckons, the
anchorman responds, the producers listen. The hijackers hold news
conferences, the correspondents simply have to attend, and the hijackers take the show from there. But news should not just be something

83. Alexander, supra note 4, at 342 (quoting the National NEWS COUNCIL, "Paper
on Terrorism," March 22, 1977, unpublished document).
84. Alexander, supra note 4, at 342.
85. Alexander, supra note 4, at 342 (quoting the Long Island Press).
86. See Corry, supra note 25. See also Alter, Lessons for the Networks, Newsweek,
July 15, 1985, at 24 [hereinafter cited as Alter].
87. Alter, supra note 86.
88. Alter, supra note 86.
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that "just happens;" it should be weighed and balanced, and then put
into context.
Two distinct regulatory schemes, govern television broadcast communications in general: federal regulation under the Communications
Act of 1934,89 and self-regulation under the National Association of
Broadcasters Television CodeY0 Before considering the applicability of
these regulatory methods to the terrorist problem, I first address the
constitutionality of such regulatory methods and the applicability of the
principle of "more speech" to federal regulation in particular. I then
proceed to the framework of federal regulation under the Communications Act to consider which of the anti-speech interests would be considered constitutionally permissible reasons for the government to
regulate the media's coverage of terrorism. And finally, I discuss the
media's attempts at self-regulation and the desirability of self-imposed
restrictions on terrorism coverage.
A.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first amendment to the constitution states, in pertinent part,
that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press." 91 Speech restrictions which are related to the suppression of expression are "presumptively unconstitutional. '92 Numerous
statutes, regulations, and case decisions, however, do regulate both
93
speech and the press.
The first amendment permits more stringent regulation of the
broadcast industry than the print industry. In FCCv. PacificaFoundation,94 the Court stated: "We have long recognized that each medium
or expression presents special first amendment problems. And of all
forms of communications, it is broadcasting that has received the most
'95
limited first amendment protection.
The principal rationales for regulating the content of broadcast
communications more strictly than printed communications are as fol89. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. sections 151-610 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Communications Act].
90. National Association of Broadcasters, The Television Code of the National Association of Broadcasters (19th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as NAB Code].
91. U.S. Const. amend I.
92. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
585 (1983).
93. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Copyright Revision
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. sections 101-810); Communications Act, supra note 89, at sections 151-610.
94. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
95. Ik at 738 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952)).
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lows: (1) The scarcity of radio frequencies; 96 (2) the weightier privacy
concerns from television's "invasion" into the home; 97 and (3) the pervasiveness of broadcasting in almost every aspect of an individual's
life.9 8

Unlike publishing a newspaper or opening a cinema, the television
programmer must obtain a license from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to operate. 99 The fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to reasonably cover all sides of controversial issues of public importance by airing opposing viewpoints, i ° ° while editors of print media
and movies can be as biased as they wish. 0 1 A broadcaster must also
present programming designed to meet the needs and interests of their
communities of license, but printed publications need not do so.' 0 2 Furthermore, broadcasters must notify and give free reply time to those
whose "honesty, character, or integrity" has been attacked during the
discussion of a controversial issue,' 03 whereas a printed publication cannot be required to do so.i°4
In addition, Congress has proscribed cigarette advertising over the
i0 5
air.
If banned in another medium, the regulations might be considi 6
ered unconstitutional.1
The constitutionality of such provisions in
0
broadcasting, however, has been upheld whenever challenged.

7

The first amendment freedom of speech is justified primarily on
the basis that the proper remedy for "false" or "bad" speech lies not in
96. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 388 (stating that "[w]here there
are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.")
97. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
98. Id,at 748.
99. Communications Act, supra note 89, at section 301 (requiring the licensing of radio stations). Traditional first amendment law forbids prior restraints or licensing of
printed publications. See MinneapolisStar, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
100. Communications Act, supra note 89, at section 315; See also Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
101. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974) (holding that
"newspapers are free to publish only one side of a controversial issue and to attack individuals without granting them space to reply").
102. 47 U.S.C.A. section 309(a) (West Supp. 1984).
103. Communications Act, supra note 89, at section 315; 47 C.F.R. section 73.1920
(1984); see also Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding right-of-reply statutes as applied to broadcasters).
104. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
105. 15 U.S.C. section 1335 (1970).
106. But cf.Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
-,
(1986) (upholding a ban on gambling advertising). After the recent Puerto Rico decision, the Court might uphold such a ban.
107. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd 405
U.S. 1000 (1972).
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its censorship, but in the opportunity to hear more speech. The additional speech serves to answer or correct the preceding speech. Justice
Brandeis best stated this principle as follows:
[Tihe fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones .... If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more
08
speech, not enforced silence.'

The principle of "more speech" rather than "enforced silence" has
become, perhaps, the single most significant concept in first amendment
jurisprudence. 109 It is only when "more speech" is not possible or practicable that the courts should allow "enforced silence." 110 For example,
the "clear and present danger" test"' permits the government to suppress speech only if "the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
112
discussion."
Because there is no absolute standard to determine whether under
any given circumstance an adequate opportunity for more speech to address preceding speech, it is a question of degree. The principle of
"more speech" does not eliminate the need to balance speech and antispeech interests. However, it is an essential, and sometimes decisive, element of the balancing process. 113 Thus, this is the standard against
which any governmental restriction of terrorist coverage would have to
be assessed.
B. FEDERAL BROADCAST REGULATION AND ANTI-SPEECH INTERESTS
The federal Communications Act

14

is based on the notions that the

108. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
109. See e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 86, 97 (1977); Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech 237 (1984).
110. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
111. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
112. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
113. Nirnmer, supra note 109, at 2-38.
114. Radio regulation began in 1910. Wireless Ship Act, Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629
(1910). The broadcast media was not subject to direct federal regulation and policing,
however, until Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), and the Communications Act. Communications Act, supra note
89, at sections 151-610. Through these latter acts, Congress created the independent
seven-member Federal Communications Commission. Communications Act at sections
154-55. The acts placed common carriers under the FCC's jurisdiction and established specific statutory guidelines for the FCC to grant and renew operating licenses. Communications Act at sections 201-244, 307. Through this authority the FCC can, in effect, directly
influence the content of broadcast programs. In granting an initial license, the FCC must
to some degree forecast future performance. To renew a license, however, the broad-
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broadcast license is a public trust and the airwaves are a limited natural
resource. 115 As a publicly owned resource, the argument continues, the
airwaves should be used primarily for the listening public's benefit,
rather than for the gain of broadcasting entrepreneurs.11 6 Thus, to
broadcast from a radio station, one must obtain a license from the
FCC 117 and the FCC may grant a license only when it will serve the
"public interest.""* 18 Congress gave the FCC this broad mandate along
with the discretion for the FCC to develop its own standards and guidelines necessary to carry out its responsibilities." 9
"Public interest" has been defined by cynics as "whatever four of
the seven FCC commissioners can agree on at any given time.' 120 Statutory and judicial attention, however, delineates the concept with just a
bit more clarity. In particular, the public interest standard cannot be
applied in a way that would infringe the first amendment rights of
broadcasters. 12 ' Thus, the constitutionality of any attempt to restrict
media coverage of terrorism will depend on the constitutionality of the
reasons for regulating the media's coverage of terrorism as delineated in
Section I.
1. Protect Victim's Privacy
There are generally no privacy rights when one is involved in a
newsworthy event. In Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn, 22 for instance,
the court discussed the issue of whether a person could claim the right
to be free from undesired publicity about his private affairs which,
although true, are embarrassing or painful, or would offend a person of
ordinary sensibilities. 12 3 In Cox, the father of a 17-year-old deceased
rape victim sued the newsman and television station for invasion of privacy by the publication of his daughter's name. 24 The Court recogcaster's past performance is the FCC's best criterion. Therefore, because a renewal applicant must literally "run on his record," he conforms his performance to what is acceptable

to the FCC. Cf., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
115. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
116. Id.
117.

Communications Act, supra note 89, at section 301.

118. Id. at sections 303, 307 (stating that a license may be granted when it will serve
"public convenience, interest, or necessity.")

119.
120.
(1978).
121.
122.
123.
124.

Hd at section 154(i); see also R. Ellmore, Broadcasting Law & Regulation 17-18.
Albert, ConstitutionalRegulation of Televised Violence, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1299, 1317
Id.
420 U.S. 469 (1974).
Id
Id.
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nized the confrontation between the claim of privacy and the freedoms
of speech and press. 125 It held, however, that the invasion on the plaintiff's privacy faded because the information was available on public record. 126 The Court stated:
Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to
public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it. In
this instance as in others reliance must rest upon the judgment of those
who decide what to publish or broadcast. 127
Under the Cox rationale, therefore, the government cannot suppress media publicity regarding victims of terrorism. Hence, the privacy
interests of terrorism victims and their families are subject to the "judgment" of the journalists and reporters.
2. Preserve Domestic Order
If media coverage of terrorist events actually risks the preservation
of domestic order and impedes counterterrorist efforts, its restriction
may be constitutional under the "clear and present danger" standard.
The standard, as established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 28 enables the
state to proscribe the advocacy' 29 of a course of action if "such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action.' 30 The Brandenburg exception is
probably not applicable to broadcasts over the television, however, because the television message is usually distributed to homes, not to public assemblies. Hence, the television message usually would not satisfy
l3
the requisite imminence.'
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
acts.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
It is arguable whether media coverage of terrorism actually "advocates" terrorist
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.

131. Brenner, The Limits of BroadcastSef-regulation under The FirstAmendment, 28

Fed. Com. B.J. 1, 15 (1975). Broadcasts may be classified into two types: entertainment
and non-entertainment. Entertainment broadcasts could arguably entail a "clear and
present danger" situation, such as when fictional "panic" broadcasts provoke community
chaos. See id. (citing H. Cantril, The Invasion From Mars: A Study in the Psychology of
Panic,Broadcasting, Dec. 23, 1974, at 25 (regarding the FCC inquiry into the hoax kidnap-

ping of a station disk jockey)). Depending on the actual scenario of the broadcast, it
might incite such chaos as to qualify for government regulation under the Brandenburg
standard.
Regarding non-entertainment broadcasts, however, the "clear and present danger"
rule might justify one kind of broadcast regulation in a state of national emergency. See
id. at 15 n. 38 (stating that "even if the Supreme Court should someday find the Communications Act in violation of the First Amendment, the paramount right of the government to acquire access to the airwaves to broadcast relief bulletins to distressed

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

The applicability of the standard to coverage of terrorist activity,
however, is unclear. Coverage of terrorist events for the purpose of preserving domestic order have yet to be censored by the government on
the basis of a presenting a "clear and present danger." But assuming
the potential for the media's coverage of terrorism to incite a national
emergency, 132 the requisite imminence might be sufficient for the government to regulate such coverage.
3. Expedite Crisis Resolution and Prevent FutureActs of Terrorism
Regulating terrorist coverage could also be based on a desire to expedite a resolution of the crisis or prevent future acts of terrorism.
Whether the government could lawfully regulate terrorist coverage for
these reasons would also depend on whether the coverage would satisfy
the Brandenburg standard. Therefore, the "clear and present danger"
analysis above would likewise apply in these instances. 133 The effect of
coverage on resolution of a current crisis, however, is probably not sufficiently "clear" to pass the "clear and present danger" standard. In addition, the effect of coverage on future acts of terrorism is probably not
sufficiently "immediate." In cases of the media releasing specific information about law enforcement plans, however, the test might be sufficient for regulation.
4. Sensationalism
The primary objections to the media's sensationalism of terrorism
is that it (1) justifies, or promotes, unpopular ideas, and (2) is offensive.134 Such objections, however, will not justify suppressing media
coverage of terrorism.
The courts have afforded first amendment protection to restrictions
on the advocation of unpopular ideas. In Winters v. New York, 135 a
New York statute made it an offense to publish or distribute publications "principally made up of criminal news, police reports or accounts
of criminal deeds or pictures or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or
crime. ' 136 The highest state court interpreted the statute as forbidding
communities cannot seriously be questioned"). See id., at 18 n.41. See also Communications Act, supra note 89, at sections 606(c), (d).

132. Although the coverage of terrorism is not likely to incite a "national emergency,"
it is plausible that it could do so by interfering with law enforcement, impeding crisis resolution, or inciting future acts of terrorism. See infra notes 13-45 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.

134. See infra Section I.E.
135. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
136. 333 U.S. at 508. Subsection 2 of section 1141 of the New York Penal Law stated,
in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 1141. Obscene prints and articles
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the "massing" of pictures and stories of bloodshed so as to incite violent
and depraved crimes against the person. 137 The Supreme Court held
that, even so interpreted, the statute was unconstitutional because it did
not establish a sufficiently definite standard of conduct.las
In 1959, after striking down a variety of laws that suppressed
counter-majoritarian expressions of ideas, l s 9 the Court articulated the
principle of the right to express offensive ideas. In Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York,' 40 the
Court struck down a New York statute that barred the exhibition of the
motion picture, "Lady Chatterley's Lover," on the grounds that the picture presented adultery in a favorable light. 141 The Court's rejection of
the statute in toto emphasized its objection to censoring nonobscene
content.142 The Court distinguished "obscenity" (which does not receive first amendment protection) from ideas that may be morally objectionable. 143 The Kingsley principle would not extend the
government's authority to restrict the freedom to express unconventional ideas to ideas, sexual or otherwise, whose impact is less disturbing than obscenity. 144 Therefore, because terrorism coverage by the
media is not obscene, but merely objectionable, restrictions designed to
prevent terrorism from being portrayed in a favorable light would likewise be held constitutionally impermissible.
Recent court decisions have continued to protect offensive
speech. 14 5 The fact that particular speech is thought by many to be of1.

A person... who,

2. Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or shows, or has
in his possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine,

newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the publication, and principally
made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime;
Is guilty of a misdemeanor."

Id
137. Winters, 333 U.S. at 514.
138. 1& at 520.

139. See e.g., Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (striking down a law
prohibiting "massed" descriptions of violence); Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 495 (striking down a

law prohibiting "sacrilegiousness"); Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Education, 346 U.S.
587 (1954) (per curiam) (striking down a law prohibiting "general immorality").

140. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
141. Id. at 685, 690.
142. See id. at 686 n.7; See also Brenner, supra note 131, at 13 n.30.
143. Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 688. The status of obscenity under the first amendment is
beyond the scope of this Note, but see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v.

California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
144. Brenner, supra note 131, at 14-15.
145. See e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

fensive by espousing political, religious, racial, or other doctrines which
may find abhorrent, is not in itself a sufficient basis for abridging
speech. 146 Offensiveness per se is therefore an anti-speech interest
which does not outweigh the opposing speech interest. 147 Hence, restrictions on terrorism coverage based on the reason that such coverage
sensationalises the crimes would be constitutionally impermissible.
C.

INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION

The broadcast industry's self-regulatory efforts historically track
the development of federal regulation.148 The NAB Code was first enacted in 1952 partly as a result of congressional upset over televised
149
hard liquor advertisements.
The NAB Code operates through a nine-member Review Board
which reports directly to the Board of Directors. 5 0 The Review Board
consists of representatives from subscribing stations and one member
from each of the three major networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS. 151 The
Review Board makes revisions in the Code and reviews Code Authority
decisions. 152 The Code Authority is responsible for the day-to-day self1 53
regulatory operations.
Most of the NAB Code is expressed in generalities that have little,
if any, content as applied to the choices involved in covering terrorism.
For instance, because air time and frequencies on which to broadcast
are limited, the NAB Code emphasizes "high standards of professional
journalism" and news reporting that is "adequate and well-balanced," is
"factual, fair and without bias," and provides "coverage consonant with
the ends of an informed and enlightened citizenry."'-' 4 The NAB Code,
also provides that the broadcaster may not delegate to others its "responsibility as to judgments necessary in news and public events progranming."'1 55 In keeping with the mandate of the Communications
146. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
147. See e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). This principle, however, is subject to qualifications such as in the
contexts of captive audiences, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and obscenity. Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
148. For a discussion of industry self-regulation beginning with the Radio Act of 1912,
37 Stat. 302, see Brenner, supra note 131, at 3 n.6.
149. Brenner, supra note 131, at 5.
150. Brenner, supra note 131, at 6.
151. Brenner, supra note 131, at 6.
152. Brenner, supra note 131, at 6.
153. Brenner, supra note 131, at 6. Such operations include clearing new network series and controversial episodes. Id. at 15.
154. NAB Code, supra note 90, at 7.
155. Id.; see Mann, supra note 13, at 440-41; cf Brenner, supra note 131, at 40-62 (challenging the constitutionality of the NAB Television Code's programming proscriptions re-

1988]

REGULATING THE MEDIA'S COVERAGE

Act, the NAB Code also requires news reporting broadcasters to serve
the "public interest" while, at the same time, avoiding all forms of govHowever, it is unclear what steps a broadcaster
ernment censorship.'
must take to fulfill this very general requirement.
The NAB Code also counsels broadcasters to "exercise due care in
the supervision of content, format and presentation of newscasts ....
and in the selection of newscasters, commentators and analysts."'1 57 For
example, broadcasters should avoid "morbid, sensational or alarming
details not essential to the factual report, especially in connection with
stories of crime."'1 58 And further, "news should be telecast in such a
manner as to avoid panic and unnecessary alarm. '159 However, these
generalities offer no help in deciding what forms of terrorist coverage
would be unduly "sensational" or cause "unnecessary alarm."
This general framework thus leaves all the operative decisions to
the discretion of individual broadcasters. It is clear that individual
broadcasters can (and often do) exercise that discretion by choosing to
tailor the news in certain respects. There are times, for instance, when
publishing the news is not the media's only role. Not publishing a story
can be just as important in certain situations, such as when publicity
might (1) jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial, and (2) endanger
160
a kidnap victim's life.
In addition, not every aspect of every event is covered by a newscast. The media can "tailor" their coverage of every story on a daily
basis 161 to balance their coverage of terrorist incidents. For instance,
the media can avoid sensationalising the story by using their discretion
to determine (1) how to allocate limited news time or news space,
(2) where to place the story on the program or in the newspaper,
(3) whether the item is "newsworthy," and (4) the general manner in
which to report it. 1 62 The media can also present the same event from a
variety of different viewpoints and, in so doing, reduce the sensationalised drama or poignancy of the terrorist act. 1 63 As an example of its taiSee Massachusetts
entertainment programming).
garding provocative themes in
Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Roth Co., 87 F. Supp. 822 (D. Mass. 1949), qff'd 183

F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950); see also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973);
Mark v. FCC, 468 F.2d 266, 268 (1st Cir.), qf'g Alexandra Mark, 34 F.C.C.2d 434 (1972)
(concern that the FCC had abdicated its programming superintendence to the NAB).

156. See Communications Act, supra note 89, at sections 303, 306-307, 326; see also
Mann supra note 13, at 440; Brenner, supra note 131, at 2.
157. NAB Code, supra note 90, at 7-8 (ch. V).
158. Id.

159. Id
160.
161.
162.
163.

[Author omitted citation-Ed note].
Mann, supra note 13, at 443.
Mann, supra note 13, at 443; see also Livingstone, supra note 72, at 71.
Mann, supra note 13, at 442.
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loring, the media will ordinarily not report terrorists' techniques to
avoid being instructional. 1 In addition, the media should not disclose
law enforcement agencies strategies.'65 At the same time, as will be discussed below, the media should give more marked coverage of the prosecution and sentencing of terrorists. News reports, however, often
appear to have been overlooked by this tailoring process. For example,
when television correspondents interview terrorists or attend news conferences conducted by terrorists, the correspondents should not gratuitously give the terrorists complete control of the interview with the
cameras running on pointlessly and dizzily.'6 Covering interviews of
terrorists, captives, or even mediators live is like letting them decide
what goes on America's front page.
An example of media self-restraint occurred in the late 1970s when
there had been a rash of occurrences where spectators at sporting
events invaded the playing fields after the game to capture their few
seconds of exposure on national television.167 After several of these episodes, some of the networks turned their cameras away. Instead, the
broadcaster reported: "There's someone running out onto the field, but
we won't show him to you because if we do, it will encourage other
clowns to do the same thing."'168 When hearing the crowd cheer, the
viewer certainly wanted to see what was happening. But it was worth
foregoing that pleasure in return for the "greater societal good"-the
nondisruption of future ball games. 169 The same type of self-restraint
should be applied when covering terrorist events. The "societal good"
to be gained in tailoring the coverage of terrorism is the diminished in70
centive to commit political murder.
The very nature of terrorist activities, however, can make balancing
terrorism coverage quite difficult. The terrorist, for instance, may have
carefully structured the incident to highlight their cause. Such tailoring
7
will not ordinarily reveal the organizations' violent presuppositions.' '
In addition, the terrorists seldom reveal alternatives available to them
within the existing structures of society through which they could assert their cause and work constructively toward a nonviolent resolution
164.

NAB Code, supra note 90, at 4 (ch. IV-i); Mann, supra note 13, at 442.

165. An exception would be where revealing such strategies is pertinent to understanding "critical social issues, such as abuses of authority or the protection of individual
rights." Mann, supra note 13, at 442.
166. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. This argument, of course, changes
when terrorists threaten to kill their hostages unless they get free run of the cameras.
167.

Harper's, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Charles Krauthammer).

168. Harper's, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Charles Krauthammer).
169. Harper's, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Charles Krauthammer).

170. Harper's, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Charles Krauthammer).
171.

Harper's, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Charles Krauthammer).
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of social problems. 172 If only for this reason alone, the media must
present a balanced news coverage.
Professional industry standards, however, are not advocated by everyone. The competitiveness of reporters is seen as a detriment to the
success of industry self-regulation, as the following analysis suggests:
Iran proved once again, beyond doubt, that terrorism is quintessentially the propaganda that also sells newspapers and increases TV ratings. In April 1977, a major television network issued a series of
internal guidelines for the coverage of terrorist incidents. Yet,
throughout the Iranian captivity, these guidelines were ignored to a far
greater extent than they were observed. All three television networks,
taking advantage of the Iranian drama, developed a blind eye to professional, ethical considerations in a fervent competitive quest for audiences. For example, despite policies prohibiting nonspontaneous
interviews, all three networks jumped at the chance to broadcast 73
their
correspondents' controlled conversations with the Ayatollah ....

1

Ted Koppel further warned that once the media's role is changed by
regulated coverage, even for reasons that may seem valid, it may be dif1 74
ficult to change it back when the reasons are no longer valid.
Warning heeded, the terrorist problem must still be dealt with.
One psychologist suggested that "the media may perform a useful reporting function if their approach serves to stabilize the situation, then
gradually confronts the terrorist with the reality and difficulty of their
position and, at the same time, prepares the public for possible outcomes of the incident.' 1 75 This view promotes, in a very general way,
172. Harper's, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Charles Krauthammer).
173. Wilber, supra note 38, at 20-21 (citing A. Miller, Terrorism, The Media And The
Law 59 (1982)).
174. Wilber, supra note 38, at 20-21. Clarence Mann has stated:
The major difficulty with the concept of self-restraint is that the media, collectively, appear to lack a thoroughly considered view of their role in dealing with
terrorism. Considering the importance of publicity to terrorist motivation, it is
incumbent on the media to review these issues carefully, to conduct the necessary practical research into the relationship of the media to terrorism and to arrive at some practical guidelines for the industry.
Mann, supra note 13, at 444. Ted Koppel further stated:
[I]t is not the job of the media to censor itself .... Press censorship was never
imposed during the Vietnam War because President Johnson was unwilling to
pay the political price of a declaration of war. If indeed our leaders believe that
we are in a state of war, then let it be declared. Once war is declared, then all
kinds of societal pressures, and indeed legal pressures, come to bear on the media
to play a different role than the one it plays right now.
Harper's, supra note 2, at 58.
175. Wilber, supra note 38, at 20 (citing A. Miller, Terrorism, the Media And The Law
61 (1982)). Regarding the reality of cooperating with the media, the author proposes the
following:
An associate director for programs at the U.S. Information Agency has suggested
that a blue-ribbon panel be created to study self-regulation of the media in ter-
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"more speech" while at the same time permitting regulation to the extent that it addresses the harms resulting from terrorism coverage. As
a general policy for reporting terrorist activity, the media need specific
guidelines that address the particular policy issues inherent in such
coverage.
If the media are unable to adopt such internal standards, then, as
stated in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, "it is conceivable that at
some future date, assertions of national interest may ultimately take
priority over the public's historic rights to be informed."'1 76 The Bulletin continues to state that "[i]t is far better to come to grips with the
77
issue now than to place trust in luck or crisis management.'
III.

LIMITING TERRORIST COVERAGE THROUGH
INDUSTRY STANDARDS

The following are possible professional industry standards 178 for
the media to deal with terrorist events in a responsible manner.
A.

DETERRENCE

Proposed: Report prosecutions and sanctions imposed on terrorists.
In many instances, the deterrent value of reporting terrorist's punishment is ignored. Because the sensational value of terrorism for the
media's purposes is in the initial terrorist act, only the initial act is
treated by the media as newsworthy. Consequently, little or no attention is given to the perpetrators' punishment. 179 The outcome of the
lengthy legal proceedings tends to only receive passing notice by the
media.' 8 0 For example, a random survey of American and European
newspapers showed that reports of the terrorists' punishment received
less than five percent the column inches of space as reports of the acrorist situations. The panel would set guidelines to help the media anticipate
critical situations where constraints might be necessary. Terrorist-Media Concerns Grow, Current news, Special Edition, Terrorism, USAF 32 (1983).
In my opinion, such an idea could be instituted at the military installation
level or local level and could serve as a good 'icebreaker' for the public affairs
representatives to meet with the media on counterterrorist issues.... The idea
would be for all to learn who the key 'players' would probably be in a terrorist
incident and for them to develop a working rapport with each other.
176. Id. at 443 (citing comments of R. Mulder at Seminar of International Press Institute, Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1976, at 16).
177. Id.
178. Voluntary acceptance of a professional code by the media ownership, even though
for reasons of public service to the community, could entail antitrust implications which
will not be addressed in this Note. Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. sections 1-7 (1982)). For a discussion of mass media and monopoly,
see Overbuck & Pullen, Major Principles of Media Law 360 (2d ed. 1985).
179. Livingstone, supra note 72, at 71.
180. Livingstone, supra note 72, at 71.
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tual terrorist acts.181 This proposal addresses primarily the problem
from the media's coverage of terrorism encouraging future acts of terrorism by deterring such acts.
B.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Proposed: Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement officials
during a terroristincident.
This proposal addresses the problem of the media's coverage of terrorism interfering with law enforcement. Compliance with this standard may entail, for example, editing reports so as to not disclose details
of law enforcement strategies that might seriously jeopardize the present or future efficacy of law enforcement by instructing terrorists, or by
endangering the lives of the public, law enforcement officers, or
182
others.
Those in the law enforcement industry have also recognized that
they "must work with the media with the view of establishing mutually
acceptable, realistic, and workable standards to be applied by both sides
during terrorist incidents.' 83 The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
states that "[a]n early goal is to establish a relationship with the media
that does not foster the idea of 'sides.' "184
While compliance with this standard does not necessarily require
reporters to do whatever law enforcement officers want, it should serve
as a general guideline to at least ensure that reporters are not recklessly or intentionally working at odds with law enforcement.
C.

NEWS TIMING

Proposed: Delay coverage until the incident is resolved.
In many instances, the United States, as well as other democratic
societies, have withheld publishing a kidnapping or extortion threat until the incident was resolved.' 85 In such kidnapping cases, the media
agrees to postpone coverage, but usually with an understanding that the
media's "blackout" is voluntary and that they will be kept well informed of important developments. 8 6 An example of a democratic government requesting a news ban involved a threat of terrorism so grave
that the West German government requested the media to silence
themselves. After the incident was resolved, the government published,
181. Livingstone, supra note 72, at 71.

182.
607 (A.
183.
184.

Paust, PrivateMeasures of Sanction, in Legal Aspects of International Terrorism
Evans & J. Murphy ed. 1978).
Wilber, supra note 38, at 21.
Wilber, supra note 38, at 21.

185. Mann, supra note 13, at 441.

186. Mann, supra note 13, at 441.
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as it had promised, a detailed account of the event.1 8 7 The rationale for
the media's cooperation in such instances depends on the circumstances
of each case, varying from the victim's safety to support of law enforcement investigation.las
The same policy could be utilized for terrorist activities. To be effective, however, the press might have to pool its releases and interview
responses. Otherwise, reporters more concerned with their ratings than
the societal good may not comply with the delay standard.
An attorney for a large transnational business enterprise also notes
that in cases of highly visible terrorist attacks, such as bombings, the
victim (in this case, the business enterprise) may have to cooperate with
the media, in return for delayed coverage, by keeping the media advised
of new developments.1 8 9 In cases such as the kidnapping of a corporate
official, the company may decide it best to avoid all comment and, in
addition, remove the official's family from the area, out of reach of reporters until the case is resolved.19° He further notes, however, that
the victim company, of course, can only attempt to moderate the terrorists' demands for publicity. It cannot control them. Neither can the
company force a victim's spouse or family to move or avoid statements
to reporters if they decide otherwise. 191
Delaying the coverage of terrorist events can lessen the harm from
media coverage in each of the concerns addressed in Section I of this
Note. Victims would not be harassed for interviews when they are the
most vulnerable, law enforcement would encounter less interference;
and the crisis could be resolved more expeditiously. Reporting the terrorist event somewhat after-the-fact would lessen the drama and sensationalism value of the reporting. Further, because publicity is a major
motivating factor for terrorists, x92 future acts of terrorism may decline
for lack of publicity. On the other hand, since publicity is such a significant factor for terrorism, news suppression might not have a substantial
preventative effect. Terrorists might resort to even more visible forms
of terrorism. For instance, terrorists could engage in more frequent
bombings of public places, public assassinations, attacks against critical
187. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 342.
188. See Mann, supra note 13, at 441. Although the rationale for delayed coverage may
vary, there is probably a good rationale for such delay in each terrorist incident.
189. Mann, supra note 13, at 442.
190. Mann, supra note 13, at 419-20, 439, 442 (where the failure of the company and
media to follow this approach in response to the kidnapping of William Niehous "reinforced media preoccupation with the incident, and may have exacerbated the relationship
between [the company] and the Venezuelan government").
191. Mann, supra note 13, at 442.
192. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text; see also Mann, supra note 13, at 438.
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public facilities and corporate institutions. 193
D.

REPETITION

Proposed: Once is enough.
The current practice of mindless repetition serves no purpose. 194
During the 1985 TWA hijacking, television ignored the editorial process
by showing whatever it could whenever it could.195 While it may be
permissible to show one news conference as demanded by hijackers and
hostageholders, it is irresponsible to allow coverage to run pointlessly
and dizzily on. 196
This proposal addresses primarily the objections to the media's sensationalism of terrorist events. Like the problem, however, the solution
is relatively ambiguous. 197 At the least, the guideline should serve to
increase broadcasters' accountability regarding the repetition of
broadcasts.
E.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

Proposed: Educate the public as to the import of terrorism on
society.
The media must make clear that even legitimate grievances cannot
justify the taking of innocent lives-especially where such grievances
can be espoused through democratic processes.' 98 This proposal thus
addresses the concern that terrorism coverage encourages future terrorist acts. The media should fulfill its "public interest" role' 99 by discussing the impact of terrorist violence on democratic institutions, including
law enforcement's dilemma of being effective and at the same time securing due process rights. Through such education, the media can rally
public sentiment against unnecessary violence and curb future acts of
terrorism. 2°° Public education can further lessen the impact from me193. Such as occurred at the Munich Olympiad.
194. See Corry, supra note 25.
195. See Corry, supra note 25.
196. See Corry, supra note 25.
197. Should news broadcast at 6:00 pm. be broadcast again at 11:00 pm? At 6:00 am.
the next day? An hour later with further developments?
198. Mann, supra note 13, at 443-44. Public education should serve to strip terrorism
of its "romantic veneer, and its violent underpinnings must be exposed to public scrutiny." Id. at 444 (citing TerroristicActivity, InternationalTerrorismr HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Laws of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 206 (1975) (testimony of Brian Crozier)).
199. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
200. The media can "channel demands, identifications, and expectations away from the
coercive, fear-ridden message of terrorist events (and thus counterpose the support of a
terrorist challenge as well as the strategy itself)." Paust, supra note 182, at 582.
The following warning, however, should be heeded:
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dia sensationalism by putting individual terrorist acts into unimpassioned perspective.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When reporting on terrorism, the media function as a two-edged
sword. They assure terrorists that their grievances will receive public
attention; yet they also can mobilize public opinion against the arbitrary
use of violence by stripping terrorism of its "romatic veneer" and exposing its violent underpinnings to public scrutiny. 20 ' The proposed general industry guidelines should minimize the harms from publicizing
terrorist events while maximizing the speech interests vital to a democratic society.
Karin Anderson Moffitt

While the media have great power to mobilize public opinion against terrorism,
in specific incidents this power must be exercised with great care. A miscalculation could endanger the lives of hostages or hamper the efforts of law enforcement authorities. At the same time, to use this power only to suppress the news
would ignore the constructive potential of the media during the course of a terrorist incident and over the longer term. Perhaps, more importantly, any injudious or prolonged suppression of the news could ultimately undermine the
media's credibility.
Mann, supra note 13, at 444.
201. Mann, supra note 13, at 444.

